George R. Packard
President, International University of Japan;
Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, President, U.S.-Japan Foundation
George R. Packard was dean of SAIS from 1979 to 1993 and is now director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies as well as professor of East Asian studies at the school. He is also president of the International University of Japan. From 1965 to 1967, he was chief diplomatic correspondent for Newsweek. Prior to that, he served as special assistant to U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer. In March of 1998, he was appointed president of the U.S.-Japan Foundation.
Packard Report - May. 1998
Although U.S.-Japan relations might seem peaceful on the surface, there are three ominous clouds on the horizon which could turn into major thunderstorms early in 1999.
First, President Clinton is charging toward romance with China - both as a way to divert the media from the scandals surrounding the White House, but more significantly, to send a strategic signal to Japan that a new order is emerging in East Asia and the U.S. may not continue to regard Japan as a major partner.
Professor Edward Lincoln represented the thinking of major government leaders when he wrote in the May-June edition of Foreign Affairs,
"It is time for the United States to send less-than-subtle signals in other areas of its relationship with Japan. The bilateral relationship includes broad consultative arrangements, within which American officials could simply stop consulting. Through canceled meetings, unreturned phone calls, and a lack of advance notice of American policy moves, the United States can send the message that it no longer regards Japan as a global partner. This may seem like a heavy-handed way to treat the world's second-largest economy, but under present circumstances it may be the only way to move Japan off a path that is destructive for us all."
The Washington Post hastened to shoot down this idea in its editorial of May 5, 1998:
"When your good friend is in trouble, kick him in the teeth: That seems to be the philosophy motivating U.S. attitudes toward Japan these days. Given Japanese arrogance in the 1980's, these attitudes may be understandable, but they don't make for good policy . . . Japan may be an irritating friend at times, but it is a friend. Forgetting that now wouldn't be right - or smart."
It is hard to find many policy folks in Washington who agree with The Post. The Lincoln view predominates, and runs along these lines:
The Japanese economy is paralyzed and there is no apparent leader on the horizon to shake things up. Thus we can "by-pass" and insult Japan as much as we want. It is no longer a major player on the world scene. China is our new "strategic partner" as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in Beijing and Tokyo last month.
This is the view that prevailed when the White House was planning Clinton's June trip to China. Should he stop in Tokyo either on the way or back? A few hardy souls said yes, but the overwhelming weight of advice said no, forget Tokyo. Since President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea will be receiving a hero's welcome here in June, only Japan will be left out of current strategic talks. This is, in effect, a partial adaptation of Lincoln's view. A sop is apparently being thrown to Hashimoto in the form of a Washington summit in September (assuming the LDP does well enough in the July Upper House elections).
The extraordinarily warm reception received here by Minshuto leader Kan Naoto can be seen as a search for new leadership to replace the apparently paralyzed Hashimoto. This is a big switch. When he first took office in January 1996, Hashimoto was greeted with a sigh of relief after Murayama: here is a guy we can do business with, it was thought. But Hashimoto's slowness to act to stimulate Japan's economy has mystified observers here. And the explanations provided by Diet members trooping through the think tanks (Nakayama Ichiro, Ikeda Yukihiko et. al.) during Golden Week did nothing to clear things up.
It must be said that Kan made the best impression of any Japanese leader since Nakasone: he was clear, precise, articulate and charming, and his attacks on the Japanese bureaucracy resonated well with the officials here who have been frustrated by MOF and MITI over the years.
The other dark clouds are:
(1) the looming and huge bilateral trade deficit the U.S. will have with Japan in 1998. If current trends continue, this will rival the huge record deficits of the mid-1980's and will lead to new cries for protectionism in the Congress - particularly if the current U.S. bubble economy should burst.
(2) Japan's apparent lack of interest or will to help Indonesia, Thailand and the other wounded Tigers by importing more of their products is causing a slow burn in Washington. The feeling is growing that Japan cares only about itself and doesn't recognize the risk of a worldwide depression should the meltdown continue.
All of this dismays Japan's true friends in Washington, but we are on the defensive. It is hard to argue with the numbers. Our only response has been similar to that of the Washington Post: Japan will recover and become a major player once again, perhaps sooner than you think. It is stupid to throw our warm bonds of friendship down the drain over these short-term issues. Besides, China does not share our aims and values the way Japan does.
But we need help.
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