George R. Packard
President, International University of Japan;
Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, President, U.S.-Japan Foundation
George R. Packard was dean of SAIS from 1979 to 1993 and is now director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies as well as professor of East Asian studies at the school. He is also president of the International University of Japan. From 1965 to 1967, he was chief diplomatic correspondent for Newsweek. Prior to that, he served as special assistant to U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer. In March of 1998, he was appointed president of the U.S.-Japan Foundation.
Packard Report - May. 2007
Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington was an apparent suceess for both leaders. President Bush used the visit to demonstrate that Japan was a firm ally even in wartime, making the point by visiting American soldiers wounded in lraq, and the Arlington National cemetery for war dead. Abe seemed glad to start a close personal relationship with Bush as Koizumi had done, and welcomed Bush's clear support for Japan's exercise of the right of collective defense.
Whether other issues were settled satisfactorily to both sides remains to be seen. The F-22 aircraft issue may still be contentious, as will therelocation of bases in Okinawa. There is definitely disagreement between them over how to deal with North Korea, as indicated below.
The really surprising aspect of the visit, however, was the lack of any effort to win media attention and the strange lack of a formal White House dinner for in honor of Abe's first official visit as Prime Minister. We know that Bush hates formal dinners, but this omission was glaringly obvious to seasoned Washington observers. "Imagine," one of them said, "if British Prime Minister Tony Blair had come to Washington for his first visit last week, There would have been a glamorous White House Dinner, a large press conference with the entire Washington press corps, and many events that would have generated publicity." Many still recall the huge banquet that President Bill Clinton hosted at the White House in honor of Prime Minister Obuchi.
In the case of Abe's visit, there was simply on Thursday night a small dinner involving tlle golfer Ben Crenshaw and his wife, and just a few other insiders such as Ambassador and Mrs. Kato Ryozo.
The two leaders went to Camp David the next day. Presumably this is an honor of some sort, but when time for a press conference, only a small pool of reporters could attend. Their stories the next day emphasized Bush's remarks on the war in lraq, and scarcely mention the leader of America's most important ally, The New York Times ran a photo of Bush and Abe at the press conference but reported nothing about their talks.
How can we explain this apparent coolness? It is possible that the White House worried too much about getting involved in Abe's colossal blunder in backtracking about the "comfort women issue." Abe seemed to disarm his critics on Capital Hill by raising the subject himself and expressing "great sympathy with the people who had been placed in that kind of situation."
A second reason may be that there remains no senior official in the executive branch who really appreciates the US - Japan alliance to the extent that Richard Armitage and Michael Green did. Without their kind of leadership and enthusiasm, the visit may have been treated as a routine matter.
A third and rather compelling factor is the clear gap that has opened up on dealing with North Korea. It is evident now that Bush and Secretary of State really want to do a deal with Pyongyang and will go to some lengths to humor Kim Jong - il. It is also clear that Abe must be concerned with the abductee issue and cannot rush into a six-party agreement until progress has been made.
American specialists who have followed these talks closely are scratching their heads and wondering what the North Koreans could possibly do to satisfy Japan's need to bring closure to the issue. They suggest that it is quite possible the North Koreans don't know what happened to the others and therefore can't come up with satisfactory explanations of their whereabouts.
This sort of guessing of course does not satisfy anyone in Japan. But Japan's best friends in Washington wish Abe could find a way to settle theissue and move on with the talks on de-nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
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